README.md
r/moul/x/social/curated
A curated list with skin in the game. Anyone lists an entry by locking a deposit, anyone challenges an entry by matching that deposit with a bond, and after a voting window the loser's money goes to the winner. The deposit does not make an entry good. It makes a bad one expensive to leave standing, which is the only reason a list anybody can write to is worth reading at all.
The engine is p/moul/x/social/curated/v0, a
pure package that returns errors and moves no coins. This realm is the chain wiring: the
envelope, the banker, the events and Render.
The API
| call | pays | does |
|---|---|---|
Apply(key, url, description) |
exactly 1 GNOT | lists the entry immediately |
Challenge(key) |
exactly that entry's deposit | opens a vote for 1000 blocks |
Vote(key, keep) |
nothing | one address, one vote, while the window is open |
Resolve(key) |
nothing | anyone, after the window: pays the winner |
Unlist(key) |
nothing | the owner takes their own entry down, if unchallenged |
Withdraw() |
nothing | collects everything credited to the caller |
Reads: Get, Count, Listed, IsListed, ChallengeOf, CreditOf.
A key is a slug: lowercase ASCII letters, digits, -, _ and ., starting alphanumeric,
at most 64 bytes. A key whose entry was removed is free to apply for again: a challenge
that wins removes an entry, it does not burn the name.
A majority of keep votes keeps the entry and credits its owner the challenger's bond.
Otherwise the entry is removed and the challenger is credited the bond plus the deposit.
A tie keeps the entry, including the tie of nobody voting at all: the incumbent paid
first and is already at risk, so the burden is on the challenger to produce a reason. If
ties went the other way, a challenge that convinced nobody would still win and listing
anything would be pointless.
The trap it avoids
Nothing is ever sent to you. Every payout is a credit in an internal ledger, and the
payee calls Withdraw() for their own. A realm that looped over winners and sent to each
one would fail entirely when one of them could not be paid, and would hand a griefer a
denial of service for the price of one entry. Withdraw zeroes the credit before the
coins move, so a reentrant call finds nothing left to take.
The consequence is an invariant worth knowing: every ugnot at this realm's address is either backing a live entry or an open challenge, or already assigned to somebody. The tests assert exactly that, against the chain balance rather than against the realm's own books.
Voting is sybil-prone, deliberately and visibly
Vote is one address, one vote, unweighted, and an address is free. A resolution says
"nobody with a stake objected enough", never "this is true". Deciding who counts as a
person is a different problem with its own realm behind it, r/moul/x/social/vouch, a
sibling in this family; until a vote is gated on a vouched identity, the two addresses
with money on the outcome are the only ones whose vote means anything.
Which is the second thing: voters are paid nothing in v0. Voting costs gas and returns nothing, so there is no reason for a disinterested address to show up at all. A share of the loser's stake for the winning side is the standard answer, and it is the first thing this realm should grow. After that, an application period, so a bad entry is not visible before anybody can object to it.
Why the bonds are GNOT and not a token of this list's own
A bond has to be denominated in something the challenger already holds. A list that minted its own token and demanded it as the bond would be asking a newcomer to acquire a token whose only use is challenging entries on a list nobody reads yet, which is the chicken-and-egg problem in its purest form: the token is worth something once the list is worth gaming, and the list cannot become worth gaming until challenges work.
So v0 bonds are native GNOT, which every account on the chain already has.
The answer becomes yes under one condition: the list is valuable enough that being on it is contested, and the challenge flow is busy enough that a bond denominated in a list token would have a real market price. Concretely, a steady stream of challenges from addresses that are not the two parties, and a reason to hold the token between challenges. At that point the token earns its own job, and it can pay the voters the paragraph above says go unpaid, which is the sink a bond alone does not provide.
The slot it would drop into is p/moul/x/social/coin/v0, a GRC20 in this family that
refuses to exist until its mint rule, its sink and its buyer are all declared. This realm
deliberately does not import it: the three answers are not available yet, and a token
issued before they are is a token with no reason to be held.
Part of moul/gno-contracts — moul's versioned gno.land contracts. See the repository for the full catalog, build/test tooling, and usage.
On mainnet:
Dependency graph:
🧪 Highly experimental — potentially vibe-coded. Not audited; may break, change, or be removed at any time. Do not use with anything of value. Full disclaimer: DISCLAIMER.
