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upgrade_registry package

Functions

AcceptOwnership

func AcceptOwnership(cur realm, contractAddr address) string

AcceptOwnership completes a nominated ownership: only the pending owner can accept, and only acceptance moves the entry (and the ownerContracts index) to them.

Param

Command

# WARNING: This command is running in an INSECURE mode.
# It is strongly recommended to use a hardware device for signing
# and avoid trusting any computer connected to the internet,
# as your private keys could be exposed.

gnokey maketx call -pkgpath "gno.land/r/g1qp5pt8cdq2f6kfdamn3yuxwg6quqnfpyewzz39/upgrade_registry" -func "AcceptOwnership" -args $'' -gas-fee 1000000ugnot -gas-wanted 1_000_000_000 -send "" -chainid "gnoland-1" -remote "https://rpc.gno.land" ADDRESSgnokey query -remote "https://rpc.gno.land" auth/accounts/ADDRESS
gnokey maketx call -pkgpath "gno.land/r/g1qp5pt8cdq2f6kfdamn3yuxwg6quqnfpyewzz39/upgrade_registry" -func "AcceptOwnership" -args $'' -gas-fee 1000000ugnot -gas-wanted 1_000_000_000 -send "" -broadcast=false ADDRESS > call.tx
gnokey sign -tx-path call.tx -chainid "gnoland-1" -account-number ACCOUNTNUMBER -account-sequence SEQUENCENUMBER ADDRESS
gnokey broadcast -remote "https://rpc.gno.land" call.tx

Deprecate

func Deprecate(cur realm, contractAddr, successorAddr address) string

Deprecate marks a contract as deprecated and points to its successor. Only the entry's owner can deprecate. The successor must itself be a REGISTERED entry — registration is self-proving, so a successor can never be a dangling pointer or an address squatted by a third party — and the successor entry must be OWNED BY THE CALLER (re-audit: without consent, an attacker could chain their entry INTO a legitimate contract, forging "official predecessor" provenance). Consent is checked AT CALL TIME: transferring the successor entry away later does not unlink an existing chain — the attestation is that both ends shared an owner when the deprecation was recorded.

Params

Command

# WARNING: This command is running in an INSECURE mode.
# It is strongly recommended to use a hardware device for signing
# and avoid trusting any computer connected to the internet,
# as your private keys could be exposed.

gnokey maketx call -pkgpath "gno.land/r/g1qp5pt8cdq2f6kfdamn3yuxwg6quqnfpyewzz39/upgrade_registry" -func "Deprecate" -args $'' -args $'' -gas-fee 1000000ugnot -gas-wanted 1_000_000_000 -send "" -chainid "gnoland-1" -remote "https://rpc.gno.land" ADDRESSgnokey query -remote "https://rpc.gno.land" auth/accounts/ADDRESS
gnokey maketx call -pkgpath "gno.land/r/g1qp5pt8cdq2f6kfdamn3yuxwg6quqnfpyewzz39/upgrade_registry" -func "Deprecate" -args $'' -args $'' -gas-fee 1000000ugnot -gas-wanted 1_000_000_000 -send "" -broadcast=false ADDRESS > call.tx
gnokey sign -tx-path call.tx -chainid "gnoland-1" -account-number ACCOUNTNUMBER -account-sequence SEQUENCENUMBER ADDRESS
gnokey broadcast -remote "https://rpc.gno.land" call.tx

GetInfo

func GetInfo(contractAddr address) string

GetInfo returns a one-line summary for a contract.

Param

Command

gnokey query vm/qeval -remote "https://rpc.gno.land" -data "gno.land/r/g1qp5pt8cdq2f6kfdamn3yuxwg6quqnfpyewzz39/upgrade_registry.GetInfo()"

Result

GetMigrationChain

func GetMigrationChain(contractAddr address) string

GetMigrationChain returns the full upgrade path starting from the given address, at most MaxChainLen hops. A chain longer than the bound is explicitly marked as truncated (re-audit: silent truncation presented a mid-chain node as the endpoint).

Param

Command

gnokey query vm/qeval -remote "https://rpc.gno.land" -data "gno.land/r/g1qp5pt8cdq2f6kfdamn3yuxwg6quqnfpyewzz39/upgrade_registry.GetMigrationChain()"

Result

GetOwnerContracts

func GetOwnerContracts(owner address) string

GetOwnerContracts returns all contract addresses whose ACCEPTED owner is the given address (nominations don't count until accepted).

Param

Command

gnokey query vm/qeval -remote "https://rpc.gno.land" -data "gno.land/r/g1qp5pt8cdq2f6kfdamn3yuxwg6quqnfpyewzz39/upgrade_registry.GetOwnerContracts()"

Result

Register

func Register(cur realm, name string, owner address) string

Register adds the CALLING contract to the registry — the entry's address is the caller's own address, which is the proof of control. owner NOMINATES a manager (team EOA or governance realm); it holds no power until it calls AcceptOwnership (nobody can be made an owner without consent — re-audit). Pass "" to manage from the contract itself — but note (audit Y4): entries are permanent, so an entry managed by a contract that has no code path for calling this registry again is FROZEN as active forever: never deprecatable, never transferable. Realms registering from init() should nominate an EOA or governance manager instead.

Params

Command

# WARNING: This command is running in an INSECURE mode.
# It is strongly recommended to use a hardware device for signing
# and avoid trusting any computer connected to the internet,
# as your private keys could be exposed.

gnokey maketx call -pkgpath "gno.land/r/g1qp5pt8cdq2f6kfdamn3yuxwg6quqnfpyewzz39/upgrade_registry" -func "Register" -args $'' -args $'' -gas-fee 1000000ugnot -gas-wanted 1_000_000_000 -send "" -chainid "gnoland-1" -remote "https://rpc.gno.land" ADDRESSgnokey query -remote "https://rpc.gno.land" auth/accounts/ADDRESS
gnokey maketx call -pkgpath "gno.land/r/g1qp5pt8cdq2f6kfdamn3yuxwg6quqnfpyewzz39/upgrade_registry" -func "Register" -args $'' -args $'' -gas-fee 1000000ugnot -gas-wanted 1_000_000_000 -send "" -broadcast=false ADDRESS > call.tx
gnokey sign -tx-path call.tx -chainid "gnoland-1" -account-number ACCOUNTNUMBER -account-sequence SEQUENCENUMBER ADDRESS
gnokey broadcast -remote "https://rpc.gno.land" call.tx

Render

func Render(path string) string

Render returns a markdown overview of the most recent entries. Never panics.

The rendered page carries an explicit scope disclosure (round-4 audit). What this registry proves is narrow and easy to over-read: an entry's ADDRESS is self-registered and therefore verified, but its NAME is an arbitrary self-asserted label that is neither unique nor checked against anything. Two entries may carry the same name, and a name may impersonate a well-known project. A reader who keys on the bold name rather than the address is trusting something this realm does not attest. Stating that in the output is the only available mitigation: the entries are immutable, and name uniqueness is deliberately NOT enforced because first-come uniqueness on a permissionless immutable registry would let an attacker burn every valuable name permanently.

Param

Command

gnokey query vm/qeval -remote "https://rpc.gno.land" -data "gno.land/r/g1qp5pt8cdq2f6kfdamn3yuxwg6quqnfpyewzz39/upgrade_registry.Render()"

Result

TransferOwnership

func TransferOwnership(cur realm, contractAddr, newOwner address) string

TransferOwnership NOMINATES a new owner for a registry entry; the nominee must AcceptOwnership to take control (two-step — re-audit). Passing "" clears a pending nomination.

Params

Command

# WARNING: This command is running in an INSECURE mode.
# It is strongly recommended to use a hardware device for signing
# and avoid trusting any computer connected to the internet,
# as your private keys could be exposed.

gnokey maketx call -pkgpath "gno.land/r/g1qp5pt8cdq2f6kfdamn3yuxwg6quqnfpyewzz39/upgrade_registry" -func "TransferOwnership" -args $'' -args $'' -gas-fee 1000000ugnot -gas-wanted 1_000_000_000 -send "" -chainid "gnoland-1" -remote "https://rpc.gno.land" ADDRESSgnokey query -remote "https://rpc.gno.land" auth/accounts/ADDRESS
gnokey maketx call -pkgpath "gno.land/r/g1qp5pt8cdq2f6kfdamn3yuxwg6quqnfpyewzz39/upgrade_registry" -func "TransferOwnership" -args $'' -args $'' -gas-fee 1000000ugnot -gas-wanted 1_000_000_000 -send "" -broadcast=false ADDRESS > call.tx
gnokey sign -tx-path call.tx -chainid "gnoland-1" -account-number ACCOUNTNUMBER -account-sequence SEQUENCENUMBER ADDRESS
gnokey broadcast -remote "https://rpc.gno.land" call.tx